Answer in brief
CVE-2026-61534 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in yayson: Prototype pollution in Store/LegacyStore deserialization. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps yayson (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps yayson (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| yaysonnpm | <=4.2.0 | 4.3.0 |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
# Summary `Store`/`LegacyStore` key internal lookup tables by the `type`, `id`, and relationship names from a JSON:API document. Because these were plain objects, a document with `type: "__proto__"` writes onto `Object.prototype`, polluting every object in the process. # Severity Suggested CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` (8.1). The guaranteed impact is process-wide DoS / logic corruption; escalation to authorization bypass or RCE is dependent on gadgets in the consuming application. # Affected / Patched - Affected: `<= 4.2.0` (verified in `3.0.0` and `4.2.0`; all 3.x and 4.x). - Patched: `4.3.0`. # Details `type` is a string *value*, untouched by `JSON.parse`, and is used directly as an object key: ```js if (!models[type]) models[type] = {} // models["__proto__"] is Object.prototype → skipped if (!models[type][id]) models[type][id] = model // → Object.prototype[id] = model ``` The attacker controls the polluted key (`id`) and value (the model, populated from `attributes`). Pollution persists for the process lifetime. The malicious type can also arrive via an `included` resource referenced by a relationship, bypassing any `data.type` allow-list. `LegacyStore` is additionally reachable when a configured `types` mapping resolves to `"__proto__"`. # Proof of concept ```js const { Store } = require('yayson')() new Store().sync({ data: { type: '__proto__', id: 'polluted', attributes: { x: 1 } } }) console.log(({}).polluted) // { x: 1, id: 'polluted' } ← Object.prototype polluted ``` # Workarounds Reject documents whose `type` or relationship names are `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`, or run Node with `--disable-proto=throw`. # Fix Null-prototype lookup tables, rejection of `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` as document-derived member names, `Object.keys()` iteration, and null-prototype normalization of caller-supplied caches.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.