Answer in brief
CVE-2026-61598 records a High severity (CVSS 0.0) vulnerability in Client mass-assignment of arbitrary view attributes via the default dj-model update_model handler. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps djust-org/djust (generic), djust (pip), djust (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 0.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps djust-org/djust (generic), djust (pip), djust (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| djust-org/djustgeneric | <1.0.7 | 1.0.7 |
| djustpip | <1.0.7 | 1.0.7 |
| djustpypi | >=0 <1.0.7 | 1.0.7 |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, `djust.mixins.model_binding.ModelBindingMixin` provides a default `update_model` event handler and is part of the LiveView base MRO, so every LiveView exposes it. It `setattr`s a view attribute whose name is client-supplied (`field`), gated only by: reject `_`-prefixed names; reject a 14-entry denylist of framework internals (`FORBIDDEN_MODEL_FIELDS`); optional `allowed_model_fields` which defaults to None = allow all; and `hasattr` existence. As a result, a client can set any public, existing view attribute — not just the fields actually bound with `dj-model=` in the rendered template. The denylist covers framework plumbing but nothing about developer business/authz state, and the allowlist is opt-in (off by default). A developer who binds one `dj-model="search"` input and also keeps `self.account_id` / `self.is_admin` / `self.total_price` as view state does not realize a client can set ALL of them via `{type:event, event:"update_model", params:{field, value}}` over the WebSocket. Type coercion matches the target attribute's type (so `"true"` -> bool True), aiding the attacker. This issue is fixed in djust 1.0.7. As a workaround, set `allowed_model_fields` explicitly on every view using dj-model (or subclassing LiveView) to the minimal list of bindable fields; do not keep authorization/ownership state in public view attributes that share the view with dj-model bindings.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.