Answer in brief
CVE-2026-61729 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.4) vulnerability in SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps socfortress/CoPilot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps socfortress/CoPilot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| socfortress/CoPilotgeneric | <0.1.76 | 0.1.76 |
Published upstream
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 30, 2026
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.