Answer in brief
CVE-2026-61810 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.0) vulnerability in libspdm: SPDM (DSP0274) FINISH transcript under-specifies the new 1.4 OpaqueData fields. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps DMTF/libspdm (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps DMTF/libspdm (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| DMTF/libspdmgeneric | = 1.4.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 11, 2026
libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. In version 1.4.0, both the FINISH request (Table 80) and the FINISH_RSP response (Table 81) gained two new fields, OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, placed before the trailing signed/authenticated field. The transcript definitions used to compute and verify the FINISH signature, the FINISH HMAC (RequesterVerifyData), and the FINISH_RSP HMAC (ResponderVerifyData) were not updated and still terminate with a step of the form. Per DSP0274, the "SPDM Header Fields" are only the four header bytes (SPDMVersion, RequestResponseCode, Param1, Param2). A literal reading therefore excludes OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, even though those fields are transmitted before the trailing signature/HMAC field. Because the signature/HMAC must cover every field transmitted before it to "protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker," an active attacker could otherwise modify the opaque data in flight without invalidating the signature or HMAC. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.