## Summary A pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability affects OpenAM. The remote authentication endpoint (`/authservice`, PLL) accepts an XML element that names an arbitrary Java class, which the server then loads and instantiates without validation. On a default configuration this is reachable **without authentication** and allows an attacker to run code on the server. ## Impact Unauthenticated remote code execution / full server compromise on any OpenAM instance with default settings. ## Affected All releases up to and including 16.1.1 (the defect predates the Open Identity Platform fork). ## Remediation Upgrade to `16.1.2`. The fix resolves the class named in a `<CustomCallback>` element without running its static initialisers and rejects it unless it implements `DSAMECallbackInterface`, and it constrains deserialisation of the serialised `Subject` value to a class allowlist. ## Interim mitigation If you cannot upgrade immediately: - **Restrict or block external network access to `/authservice`.** This is the only reliable mitigation. - Optionally, **block PLL requests carrying a `<CustomCallback className="...">` element** at the reverse proxy or WAF. That element is only produced for custom `DSAMECallbackInterface` callbacks, so most deployments never send it — confirm against your own traffic before enforcing. - **Enabling `sunRemoteAuthSecurityEnabled` does *not* mitigate this issue.** The remote-auth security token is checked in `AuthXMLHandler.processAuthXMLRequest`, which runs only after `AuthXMLRequest.parseXML` has already parsed the request and instantiated the class named in the `<CustomCallback className="...">` element. Do not rely on it as a substitute for upgrading or for network restriction. ## Credit Vulnerability discovered by Zhixi "Jace" Sun of ASM/VI at TikTok. Correction of the interim mitigation guidance contributed by @BarakSrour.

## Summary A pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability affects OpenAM. The remote authentication endpoint (`/authservice`, PLL) accepts an XML element that names an arbitrary Java class, which the server then loads and instantiates without validation. On a default configuration this is reachable **without authentication** and allows an attacker to run code on the server. ## Impact Unauthenticated remote code execution / full server compromise on any OpenAM instance with default settings. ## Affected All releases up to and including 16.1.1 (the defect predates the Open Identity Platform fork). ## Remediation Upgrade to `16.1.2`. The fix resolves the class named in a `<CustomCallback>` element without running its static initialisers and rejects it unless it implements `DSAMECallbackInterface`, and it constrains deserialisation of the serialised `Subject` value to a class allowlist. ## Interim mitigation If you cannot upgrade immediately: - **Restrict or block external network access to `/authservice`.** This is the only reliable mitigation. - Optionally, **block PLL requests carrying a `<CustomCallback className="...">` element** at the reverse proxy or WAF. That element is only produced for custom `DSAMECallbackInterface` callbacks, so most deployments never send it — confirm against your own traffic before enforcing. - **Enabling `sunRemoteAuthSecurityEnabled` does *not* mitigate this issue.** The remote-auth security token is checked in `AuthXMLHandler.processAuthXMLRequest`, which runs only after `AuthXMLRequest.parseXML` has already parsed the request and instantiated the class named in the `<CustomCallback className="...">` element. Do not rely on it as a substitute for upgrading or for network restriction. ## Credit Vulnerability discovered by Zhixi "Jace" Sun of ASM/VI at TikTok. Correction of the interim mitigation guidance contributed by @BarakSrour.