Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch} (CVE-2026-62993) | HOL Guard CVE

Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-62993

Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-62993 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps smarty-php/smarty (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 31, 2026Updated Aug 31, 2026Source checked Aug 31, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 31, 2026Material review Aug 31, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps smarty-php/smarty (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
smarty-php/smartygeneric	>= 5.0.0, < 5.8.2 \|\| < 4.5.7	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for smarty-php/smarty.
Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

Smarty is a template engine for PHP, facilitating the separation of presentation (HTML/CSS) from application logic. Prior to 4.5.7 and 5.8.2, depending on the release line, Smarty's {fetch} handling in libs/plugins/function.fetch.php and src/FunctionHandler/Fetch.php used Security::isTrustedUri() to validate only the initial remote URL against trusted_uri when a security policy was active. For resources handled by file_get_contents(), including HTTPS URLs, PHP followed HTTP redirects by default. An attacker who could supply or influence a fetch target and had an open redirect on a trusted host could redirect the request to an attacker-chosen internal endpoint, bypass the trusted_uri allowlist, and perform server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.7 and 5.8.2.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.