Answer in brief
CVE-2026-63754 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in SurrealDB: Crafting malicious LIVE queries writes to the database, resulting in DoS, without permission to the table required. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps surrealdb (crates.io), surrealdb (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps surrealdb (crates.io), surrealdb (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| surrealdbcrates.io | >=0 <3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
| surrealdbrust | <3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
Published upstream
Jul 1, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
A `LIVE` query whose `WHERE` clause evaluates to an error caused the source data modifier (the user creating, updating, or deleting a record on the watched table) to fail instead. Calling any arbitrary SurrealQL function with a typed parameter and passing a value of the wrong type — for example `LIVE SELECT * FROM t WHERE string::trim(deny)` — triggered an evaluation error inside the LIVE notification path. That error then propagated through to the triggering write, rolling back the attempted change. While such a `LIVE` query was registered, all `CREATE`, `UPDATE`, and `DELETE` operations on the watched table failed — including those issued by a root user — for as long as the registration remained active. Registering the `LIVE` required `select` permission on the table; no other permission on the table was needed. ### Impact An authenticated user with `select` permission on a table can prevent all `CREATE`, `UPDATE`, and `DELETE` operations on that table — by any other user, up to and including root — for the lifetime of a single registered `LIVE` query. Service is restored when the `LIVE` query is killed or the session that registered it ends. ### Patches A patch has been introduced that: 1. **Decouples LIVE query evaluation errors from the source transaction** — when `lq_check` returns an error during the LIVE notification path, the error is now reported to the LIVE subscriber as an `Action::Error` notification and the LIVE processing path returns `Ok(())`. The triggering write proceeds normally. 2. **Defers the error notification until after the permission check** — the `Action::Error` notification is only delivered after the LIVE subscription's `PERMISSIONS` clause has been evaluated, so unauthorised subscribers do not learn even that an error occurred (closing an information-disclosure side channel introduced by the first part of the fix). - Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Users unable to upgrade should restrict the ability of untrusted users to register `LIVE` queries by removing the `select` permission on tables they want to keep writeable, or by gating LIVE registration at the application layer.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.