Answer in brief
CVE-2026-63915 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-63915 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <ed6d5d97dad0334a7f43d218753429cbe2f70a4f || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <b99366d74b535d0cadb1ef73e04639415d9ff3b7 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <37382293f174b82a0616c8295e32b1fc8e13d1ed || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <c4cc6b3b0013acb3ed0b2b60e57dfae98647fe98 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <1905f5ec3641b2b234bb63549c8ca11ab85466eb || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <22d41b176b9989efd21c3b2d3abf6728f05b9d9a || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <83b1362edc9d6ae376c6f36da116e2c70f2e70a6 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <f040e590c035bfd9553fe79ee9585caf1b14d67b | ed6d5d97dad0334a7f43d218753429cbe2f70a4f, b99366d74b535d0cadb1ef73e04639415d9ff3b7, 37382293f174b82a0616c8295e32b1fc8e13d1ed, c4cc6b3b0013acb3ed0b2b60e57dfae98647fe98, 1905f5ec3641b2b234bb63549c8ca11ab85466eb, 22d41b176b9989efd21c3b2d3abf6728f05b9d9a, 83b1362edc9d6ae376c6f36da116e2c70f2e70a6, f040e590c035bfd9553fe79ee9585caf1b14d67b |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read packet->header from skb->data at function entry without first checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet->header. The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written. Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each function before packet->header is first accessed. The existing pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message header.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <ed6d5d97dad0334a7f43d218753429cbe2f70a4f || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <b99366d74b535d0cadb1ef73e04639415d9ff3b7 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <37382293f174b82a0616c8295e32b1fc8e13d1ed || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <c4cc6b3b0013acb3ed0b2b60e57dfae98647fe98 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <1905f5ec3641b2b234bb63549c8ca11ab85466eb || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <22d41b176b9989efd21c3b2d3abf6728f05b9d9a || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <83b1362edc9d6ae376c6f36da116e2c70f2e70a6 || >=8b8d2e08bf0d50193931afd27482a59376b66b2b <f040e590c035bfd9553fe79ee9585caf1b14d67b | ed6d5d97dad0334a7f43d218753429cbe2f70a4f, b99366d74b535d0cadb1ef73e04639415d9ff3b7, 37382293f174b82a0616c8295e32b1fc8e13d1ed, c4cc6b3b0013acb3ed0b2b60e57dfae98647fe98, 1905f5ec3641b2b234bb63549c8ca11ab85466eb, 22d41b176b9989efd21c3b2d3abf6728f05b9d9a, 83b1362edc9d6ae376c6f36da116e2c70f2e70a6, f040e590c035bfd9553fe79ee9585caf1b14d67b |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read packet->header from skb->data at function entry without first checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet->header. The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written. Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each function before packet->header is first accessed. The existing pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message header.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.