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  4. CVE 2026 63979 nethandshake hand off the pinned file reference
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-63979

net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doitCVE-2026-63979

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-63979 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jul 19, 2026Updated Oct 21, 2026Source checked Nov 4, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 5, 2026Material review Oct 21, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
4 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4 || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4, f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055
Linux/Linuxgeneric6.4Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <68eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4 || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be05568eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f, c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4, f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <b869e3e4ce1996df23b3efdbbe9a64c4ab81d745 || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <2f28dbb30b88eafab8d49aaec94710b4e12dea8e || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <68eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4 || >=3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055b869e3e4ce1996df23b3efdbbe9a64c4ab81d745, 2f28dbb30b88eafab8d49aaec94710b4e12dea8e, 68eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f, c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4, f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4; Linux/Linux to 68eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f; Linux/Linux to b869e3e4ce1996df23b3efdbbe9a64c4ab81d745 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jul 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 21, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 5, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • FreeRDP before 3.32.2 Use-After-Free via rdpgfx Dynamic Virtual Channel CloseAlso CWE-416
  • FreeRDP before 3.32.2 Use-After-Free in Smartcard Emulation ReleaseContextAlso CWE-416

Record context

Vulnerability class
Memory Corruption
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-416
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 4, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record