Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64046 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64046 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <49a5faaa471ddcd37b6893970c9916eb836e7c31 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <91359966e247c0244c66d50bbb8e74aefa4321c3 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <410351158dfef2d67fea6603680b3a6013c6ed9d || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <acdc12b71c9aa4be5dcd2c8062753c6d2033e235 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <929b1548e63ac72e104c07d8ee8cbbeeba2fa89a || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <af855f4c966afafef74faf8390c7b86568c0d46d || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <b9c015ef1a7bf1e8dc67f21c6381f36deb2c3a36 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <ff26a0e8377dec07e4a7230db7675bed1b9a6d03 || d529d6c9f7e3aaeac13c4948f79799ccb825f29d || >=5.4.14 <5.5 | 49a5faaa471ddcd37b6893970c9916eb836e7c31, 91359966e247c0244c66d50bbb8e74aefa4321c3, 410351158dfef2d67fea6603680b3a6013c6ed9d, acdc12b71c9aa4be5dcd2c8062753c6d2033e235, 929b1548e63ac72e104c07d8ee8cbbeeba2fa89a, af855f4c966afafef74faf8390c7b86568c0d46d, b9c015ef1a7bf1e8dc67f21c6381f36deb2c3a36, ff26a0e8377dec07e4a7230db7675bed1b9a6d03, 5.5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <49a5faaa471ddcd37b6893970c9916eb836e7c31 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <91359966e247c0244c66d50bbb8e74aefa4321c3 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <410351158dfef2d67fea6603680b3a6013c6ed9d || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <acdc12b71c9aa4be5dcd2c8062753c6d2033e235 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <929b1548e63ac72e104c07d8ee8cbbeeba2fa89a || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <af855f4c966afafef74faf8390c7b86568c0d46d || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <b9c015ef1a7bf1e8dc67f21c6381f36deb2c3a36 || >=9aaaa56845a06aeabdd597cbe19492dc01f281ec <ff26a0e8377dec07e4a7230db7675bed1b9a6d03 || d529d6c9f7e3aaeac13c4948f79799ccb825f29d || >=5.4.14 <5.5 | 49a5faaa471ddcd37b6893970c9916eb836e7c31, 91359966e247c0244c66d50bbb8e74aefa4321c3, 410351158dfef2d67fea6603680b3a6013c6ed9d, acdc12b71c9aa4be5dcd2c8062753c6d2033e235, 929b1548e63ac72e104c07d8ee8cbbeeba2fa89a, af855f4c966afafef74faf8390c7b86568c0d46d, b9c015ef1a7bf1e8dc67f21c6381f36deb2c3a36, ff26a0e8377dec07e4a7230db7675bed1b9a6d03, 5.5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.