Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64055 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: ethernet: cortina: Carry over frag counter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64055 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: ethernet: cortina: Carry over frag counter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <df31e3b64455293df1ea89c7da7d5c9bfbcdd253 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <7af1fabdee744b7995fe01b30b77dfc397657cb5 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <75105fcf73f1ce7d9f769aaefec6e6d6645d5ac0 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <78cf08b3be47c28f07008a76c932bad7cdffa9d8 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <7123cf481e21b54eb6adc4cb0d8dc2876aeaee41 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <c373b34877afea61c89e0dd2e38948c624249b9b || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <46806096f35b8d3dfa2f321ddd77f597edcdb85f || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <ebd8ec2b309e3a447851b456ccaf8fb39f3661e7 | df31e3b64455293df1ea89c7da7d5c9bfbcdd253, 7af1fabdee744b7995fe01b30b77dfc397657cb5, 75105fcf73f1ce7d9f769aaefec6e6d6645d5ac0, 78cf08b3be47c28f07008a76c932bad7cdffa9d8, 7123cf481e21b54eb6adc4cb0d8dc2876aeaee41, c373b34877afea61c89e0dd2e38948c624249b9b, 46806096f35b8d3dfa2f321ddd77f597edcdb85f, ebd8ec2b309e3a447851b456ccaf8fb39f3661e7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.16 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: cortina: Carry over frag counter The gmac_rx() NAPI poll function assembles packets in an SKB from a ring buffer. If the ring buffer gets completely emptied during a poll cycle, we exit gmac_rx(), but the packet is not yet completely assembled in the SKB, yet the fragment counter frag_nr is reset to zero on the next invocation. Solve this by making the RX fragment counter a part of the port struct, and carry it over between invocations. Reset the fragment counter only right after calling napi_gro_frags(), on error (after calling napi_free_frags()) or if stopping the port. Reset it in some place where not strictly necessary just to emphasize what is going on. This was found by Sashiko during normal patch review.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <df31e3b64455293df1ea89c7da7d5c9bfbcdd253 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <7af1fabdee744b7995fe01b30b77dfc397657cb5 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <75105fcf73f1ce7d9f769aaefec6e6d6645d5ac0 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <78cf08b3be47c28f07008a76c932bad7cdffa9d8 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <7123cf481e21b54eb6adc4cb0d8dc2876aeaee41 || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <c373b34877afea61c89e0dd2e38948c624249b9b || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <46806096f35b8d3dfa2f321ddd77f597edcdb85f || >=4d5ae32f5e1e13f7f36d6439ec3257993b9f5b88 <ebd8ec2b309e3a447851b456ccaf8fb39f3661e7 | df31e3b64455293df1ea89c7da7d5c9bfbcdd253, 7af1fabdee744b7995fe01b30b77dfc397657cb5, 75105fcf73f1ce7d9f769aaefec6e6d6645d5ac0, 78cf08b3be47c28f07008a76c932bad7cdffa9d8, 7123cf481e21b54eb6adc4cb0d8dc2876aeaee41, c373b34877afea61c89e0dd2e38948c624249b9b, 46806096f35b8d3dfa2f321ddd77f597edcdb85f, ebd8ec2b309e3a447851b456ccaf8fb39f3661e7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.16 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: cortina: Carry over frag counter The gmac_rx() NAPI poll function assembles packets in an SKB from a ring buffer. If the ring buffer gets completely emptied during a poll cycle, we exit gmac_rx(), but the packet is not yet completely assembled in the SKB, yet the fragment counter frag_nr is reset to zero on the next invocation. Solve this by making the RX fragment counter a part of the port struct, and carry it over between invocations. Reset the fragment counter only right after calling napi_gro_frags(), on error (after calling napi_free_frags()) or if stopping the port. Reset it in some place where not strictly necessary just to emphasize what is going on. This was found by Sashiko during normal patch review.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.