Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64339 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=121a0f839dbb397af5fabb701cea3e9983223e50 <48394f94211cf8fe0ea8604fc441633abf90fc94 || >=121a0f839dbb397af5fabb701cea3e9983223e50 <fc1b546973c1442d5b947fcdd03581f20ecc5bd2 || >=121a0f839dbb397af5fabb701cea3e9983223e50 <8c6314489550fa81d41723a0ff33f655b5b6c7b6 | 48394f94211cf8fe0ea8604fc441633abf90fc94, fc1b546973c1442d5b947fcdd03581f20ecc5bd2, 8c6314489550fa81d41723a0ff33f655b5b6c7b6 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len) into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || (ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing "act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above. The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never leave the allocation. Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is also available.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.