Answer in brief
CVE-2026-64435 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <69f98fff30bdaa72b0cb0e7e078ab6456a0a59b0 || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <b35597bdae1a5d8395da4b9baa993b9b71f74d68 || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <e575dabb805252e3113fdc3f56f6ecacfde422d0 || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <7ff42312ccde549f8c698723822c7db35107a39b || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <a3d85dec60bb0622360fc176b2a51abdbe2ff0ad || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <fe997a84a385f840b593ead92e575503a5046cee || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <c5186201fa7030289cc4fe23fae87a3fcb566856 || >=3197542482df22c2a131d4a813280bd7c54cedf5 <c9a71daaecb2fb1d8c704545cc0b1c920b9bf5d7 | 69f98fff30bdaa72b0cb0e7e078ab6456a0a59b0, b35597bdae1a5d8395da4b9baa993b9b71f74d68, e575dabb805252e3113fdc3f56f6ecacfde422d0, 7ff42312ccde549f8c698723822c7db35107a39b, a3d85dec60bb0622360fc176b2a51abdbe2ff0ad, fe997a84a385f840b593ead92e575503a5046cee, c5186201fa7030289cc4fe23fae87a3fcb566856, c9a71daaecb2fb1d8c704545cc0b1c920b9bf5d7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.10 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE() protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races. All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites: - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment) - audit_receive() backlog check - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn() KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57: skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0 kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220 kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430 kthread+0x1c2/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1: audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0 audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0 do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260 get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0 value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(), which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() write accesses already present on the writer side. [PM: line length tweak]
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.