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  4. CVE 2026 64586 wifi brcmfmac drain busreset work on device
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Back to active CVEs
High ยท CVSS 8.8CVE-2026-64586

wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removalCVE-2026-64586

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-64586 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 6, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Nov 4, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 6, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High ยท CVSS 8.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
4 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985, 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7, e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683, 02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e, 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985, 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.2Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 || >=4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c519459dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da, 4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc, 61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac, c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7, e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683, 02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e, 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985, 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985; Linux/Linux to c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7; Linux/Linux to 9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 6, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 6, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Memory Corruption
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-416
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 4, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record