Answer in brief
CVE-2026-66882 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.1) vulnerability in Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic/ash_authenticationgeneric | >=fe0b4558dbe852fee5d81a460a8355577618a8c8 <* | * |
| team-alembic/ash_authenticationgeneric | >=4.8.0 <4.14.2 || >=5.0.0-rc.0 <5.0.0-rc.13 | 4.14.2, 5.0.0-rc.13 |
| team-alembic/team-alembic/ash_authenticationgeneric | >=fe0b4558dbe852fee5d81a460a8355577618a8c8 <* | * |
Published upstream
Aug 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 25, 2026
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms. When a strategy is configured with require_interaction? set to true, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's value attribute without HTML escaping: lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex interpolates the confirm parameter, and lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with EEx.function_from_file/3 using plain <%= %> expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim. Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2 only checks that a confirm key is present, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2 reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a <script> element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required. The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.