Answer in brief
CVE-2026-66883 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in Oidcc.Plug.Authorize user agent session binding inert due to case-sensitive header lookup. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/erlef/oidcc_plug (generic), Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/oidcc_plug (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/erlef/oidcc_plug (generic), Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/oidcc_plug (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/erlef/oidcc_pluggeneric | >=0a75fb139d8e2686d1b75e0d48962323d2181673 <f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557 | f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557 |
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation/oidcc_pluggeneric | >=0.1.0-alpha.3 <0.5.0 | 0.5.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 4, 2026
Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2. Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client's user agent with get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent. The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; it removes one layer that would otherwise hinder use of a stolen or leaked session, such as an exfiltrated session cookie replayed from a different client. The CSRF/state, nonce, and PKCE checks are unaffected and continue to function. Deployments that never enabled check_useragent are not affected in practice, since they never expected the binding. The corresponding lookup in Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback correctly uses the lowercase key and is not affected. This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.1.0-alpha.3 before 0.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.