Answer in brief
CVE-2026-67435 records a Medium severity ssrf vulnerability in linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-67435 records a Medium severity ssrf vulnerability in linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Update linuxfabrik-lib to 6.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSSRF describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-67435 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| linuxfabrik-libpip | <6.0.0 | 6.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-67435 records a Medium severity ssrf vulnerability in linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for linuxfabrik-lib.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate linuxfabrik-lib to 6.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSSRF describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-67435 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| linuxfabrik-libpip | <6.0.0 | 6.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-67435 records a Medium severity ssrf vulnerability in linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for linuxfabrik-lib.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard### Summary `lib.url.fetch()` follows HTTP redirects (`follow_redirects=True`). httpx strips only `Authorization` and `Cookie` when a redirect crosses the origin, so any other caller-supplied credential header (a session token such as Redfish's `X-Auth-Token`, an API key, ...) was still sent to the redirect target. A malicious or redirect-capable server can therefore answer an authenticated request with a `3xx` to an attacker-chosen host and receive the credential (server-side request forgery + token disclosure). The pre-httpx `urllib` implementation was worse: it forwarded every header, including `Authorization`, across cross-host redirects. ### Impact Any plugin that authenticates to a host with a non-standard auth header and follows that host's redirects can be coerced into sending the credential, and an authenticated request, to another host the monitoring server can reach. The concrete case is the Redfish checks (`X-Auth-Token`), but the flaw is in the shared `fetch()` and affects every consumer. ### Patches Fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.0.0 (commit 6573ff9). On a cross-origin redirect (any scheme/host/port change other than a plain same-host HTTP-to-HTTPS upgrade) `fetch()` now keeps only benign transport headers and drops every other caller-supplied header, so credentials never follow a redirect to a different origin.
### Summary `lib.url.fetch()` follows HTTP redirects (`follow_redirects=True`). httpx strips only `Authorization` and `Cookie` when a redirect crosses the origin, so any other caller-supplied credential header (a session token such as Redfish's `X-Auth-Token`, an API key, ...) was still sent to the redirect target. A malicious or redirect-capable server can therefore answer an authenticated request with a `3xx` to an attacker-chosen host and receive the credential (server-side request forgery + token disclosure). The pre-httpx `urllib` implementation was worse: it forwarded every header, including `Authorization`, across cross-host redirects. ### Impact Any plugin that authenticates to a host with a non-standard auth header and follows that host's redirects can be coerced into sending the credential, and an authenticated request, to another host the monitoring server can reach. The concrete case is the Redfish checks (`X-Auth-Token`), but the flaw is in the shared `fetch()` and affects every consumer. ### Patches Fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.0.0 (commit 6573ff9). On a cross-origin redirect (any scheme/host/port change other than a plain same-host HTTP-to-HTTPS upgrade) `fetch()` now keeps only benign transport headers and drops every other caller-supplied header, so credentials never follow a redirect to a different origin.