Answer in brief
CVE-2026-68119 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <bbb7db8c74b0b5d17a695136f0f0806ecd0118f6 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <fadaff3f66e124c3a62237f9c881819a8ac90309 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <a859b280441fb02f64ed4037f03d5c0c34a7a595 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 | bbb7db8c74b0b5d17a695136f0f0806ecd0118f6, fadaff3f66e124c3a62237f9c881819a8ac90309, a859b280441fb02f64ed4037f03d5c0c34a7a595, e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.7 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 10, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a four-byte boundary. tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC. Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path. This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid authenticated header.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-68119 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <bbb7db8c74b0b5d17a695136f0f0806ecd0118f6 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <fadaff3f66e124c3a62237f9c881819a8ac90309 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <a859b280441fb02f64ed4037f03d5c0c34a7a595 || >=decde2586b34b99684faff1eab41e5c496c27fb6 <e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 | bbb7db8c74b0b5d17a695136f0f0806ecd0118f6, fadaff3f66e124c3a62237f9c881819a8ac90309, a859b280441fb02f64ed4037f03d5c0c34a7a595, e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.7 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 10, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a four-byte boundary. tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC. Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path. This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid authenticated header.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.