Answer in brief
CVE-2026-68500 records a High severity csrf vulnerability in Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 3 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-68500 records a High severity csrf vulnerability in Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 3 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
Update sylius/mollie-plugin to 2.2.8; sylius/mollie-plugin to 3.2.4; sylius/mollie-plugin to 3.3.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCSRF describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-68500 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | <2.2.8 | 2.2.8 |
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | >=3.0.0,<3.2.4 | 3.2.4 |
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | >=3.3.0,<3.3.1 | 3.3.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-68500 records a High severity csrf vulnerability in Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 3 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate sylius/mollie-plugin to 2.2.8; sylius/mollie-plugin to 3.2.4; sylius/mollie-plugin to 3.3.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCSRF describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-68500 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | <2.2.8 | 2.2.8 |
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | >=3.0.0,<3.2.4 | 3.2.4 |
| sylius/mollie-plugincomposer | >=3.3.0,<3.3.1 | 3.3.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-68500 records a High severity csrf vulnerability in Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 3 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is acknowledged with `HTTP 200` and no state change is applied. `HTTP 200` is intentional, because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response. The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads both of them (mirroring `CaptureAction`): - `payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id']` for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct flows, stored in `CreatePaymentAction`. - `order.getMolliePaymentId()` for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself (`QrCodeAction`). Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their payment details carry no `payment_mollie_id`, so both sources must be consulted. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie id matches the id stored for that order **before** handing over to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x. #### Step 1. Create the decorator Create `src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php` in your Sylius project: ```php <?php declare(strict_types=1); namespace App\Controller\Mollie; use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface; use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface; use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response; final class SecurePaymentWebhookController { public function __construct( private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner, private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository, ) { } public function __invoke(Request $request): Response { $orderId = $request->get('orderId'); $molliePaymentId = $request->get('id'); if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) { return ($this->inner)($request); } /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */ $order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]); if (null === $order) { return ($this->inner)($request); } $storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order); // Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order. // 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response. if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) { return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK); } return ($this->inner)($request); } private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string { $payment = $order->getLastPayment(); $fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null; if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) { return (string) $fromDetails; } // QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself. if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) { $fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId(); if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) { return (string) $fromOrder; } } return null; } } ``` #### Step 2. Register the decorator Append to your project's `config/services.yaml`: ```yaml services: App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePaymentWebhookController: decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook public: true arguments: $inner: '@.inner' $orderRepository: '@sylius.repository.order' ``` > `decorates:` keeps the original service ID, so the route > `_controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook` keeps working with no route > changes. `@.inner` is the original plugin controller. #### Step 3. Clear the cache ```bash bin/console cache:clear ```
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is acknowledged with `HTTP 200` and no state change is applied. `HTTP 200` is intentional, because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response. The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads both of them (mirroring `CaptureAction`): - `payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id']` for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct flows, stored in `CreatePaymentAction`. - `order.getMolliePaymentId()` for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself (`QrCodeAction`). Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their payment details carry no `payment_mollie_id`, so both sources must be consulted. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie id matches the id stored for that order **before** handing over to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x. #### Step 1. Create the decorator Create `src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php` in your Sylius project: ```php <?php declare(strict_types=1); namespace App\Controller\Mollie; use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface; use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface; use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response; final class SecurePaymentWebhookController { public function __construct( private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner, private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository, ) { } public function __invoke(Request $request): Response { $orderId = $request->get('orderId'); $molliePaymentId = $request->get('id'); if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) { return ($this->inner)($request); } /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */ $order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]); if (null === $order) { return ($this->inner)($request); } $storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order); // Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order. // 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response. if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) { return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK); } return ($this->inner)($request); } private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string { $payment = $order->getLastPayment(); $fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null; if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) { return (string) $fromDetails; } // QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself. if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) { $fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId(); if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) { return (string) $fromOrder; } } return null; } } ``` #### Step 2. Register the decorator Append to your project's `config/services.yaml`: ```yaml services: App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePaymentWebhookController: decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook public: true arguments: $inner: '@.inner' $orderRepository: '@sylius.repository.order' ``` > `decorates:` keeps the original service ID, so the route > `_controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook` keeps working with no route > changes. `@.inner` is the original plugin controller. #### Step 3. Clear the cache ```bash bin/console cache:clear ```