Answer in brief
CVE-2026-68558 records a High severity (CVSS 8.5) vulnerability in Wekan: SSRF filter bypass via DNS-resolving hostname in outgoing webhooks (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53446). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps wekan/wekan (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps wekan/wekan (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| wekan/wekangeneric | >= 8.36, < 9.74 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 19, 2026
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with `dns.lookup({ all: true })`, validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.