Answer in brief
CVE-2026-70375 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Field. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cmsgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-70375 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Field. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cmsgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.