snmp BER INTEGER decoder applies no size limit to attacker-supplied integer fields

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP snmp allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by sending an SNMP message containing a BER INTEGER whose length field is arbitrarily large. snmp_pdus:dec_integer_notag/1 defaults its size limit to infinity, and do_dec_integer_notag/2 then accumulates the value across every declared byte with a recursive shift and bitwise or. Work grows superlinearly in the declared length because each operation acts on a progressively larger bignum. The size-limited variant dec_integer_notag/2 exists but is reached from only one call site, dec_snmp_version/1, which bounds the version field to ten bytes; the request identifier, error status and index, generic and specific trap fields, engine boots and time, and every varbind value decoded by dec_value/1 all use the unbounded form. The decode runs before the PDU is processed, so no valid request is required beyond what the deployment demands to accept the message at all. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to snmp from 4.25.1 before 5.18.2.1, from 5.19 before 5.20.2.2, and from 5.20.3 before 5.20.5. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to snmp before 4.25.1, is affected is unknown.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.