Answer in brief
CVE-2026-71850 records a Medium severity vulnerability in Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps honojs/hono (generic), hono (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps honojs/hono (generic), hono (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| honojs/honogeneric | >= 3.8.0, < 4.12.34 | Not reported |
| hononpm | >=3.8.0,<4.12.34 | 4.12.34 |
Published upstream
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-71850 records a Medium severity vulnerability in Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps honojs/hono (generic), hono (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps honojs/hono (generic), hono (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| honojs/honogeneric | >= 3.8.0, < 4.12.34 | Not reported |
| hononpm | >=3.8.0,<4.12.34 | 4.12.34 |
Published upstream
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.