Answer in brief
CVE-2026-71891 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in BLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curve. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc./bcprov (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc./bcprov (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc./bcprovgeneric | >=1.85 <1.86 | 1.86 |
Published upstream
Oct 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 3, 2026
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.