Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72300 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=5c37bd025068381f5bdbbf6a5ae3a1da8f6ed928 <7c6d2d2baeb1e62dc8c6951d27edc16c5ea6e3aa || >=06d4938e41d62af7b5b3f39eb239f58b21f50443 <a40e250414b463e953c54cd2a829c9a9a49a78c3 || >=55024322915539098f7a7dd318351c7a003ff041 <d34deef34c99bb4b3ebd2ac51058857827a20e7e || >=215e5fe75881a7e2425df04aeeed47a903d5cd5d <201b60c4d15538fcc3c0c2ea9b75dd7d0f58022c || >=215e5fe75881a7e2425df04aeeed47a903d5cd5d <8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05 || 756c48bdf23050def518e85929be6edea9ae6823 || >=6.6.136 <6.6.145 || >=6.12.83 <6.12.97 || >=6.18.24 <6.18.40 || >=6.19.14 <6.20 | 7c6d2d2baeb1e62dc8c6951d27edc16c5ea6e3aa, a40e250414b463e953c54cd2a829c9a9a49a78c3, d34deef34c99bb4b3ebd2ac51058857827a20e7e, 201b60c4d15538fcc3c0c2ea9b75dd7d0f58022c, 8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 6.20 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72300 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=5c37bd025068381f5bdbbf6a5ae3a1da8f6ed928 <7c6d2d2baeb1e62dc8c6951d27edc16c5ea6e3aa || >=06d4938e41d62af7b5b3f39eb239f58b21f50443 <a40e250414b463e953c54cd2a829c9a9a49a78c3 || >=55024322915539098f7a7dd318351c7a003ff041 <d34deef34c99bb4b3ebd2ac51058857827a20e7e || >=215e5fe75881a7e2425df04aeeed47a903d5cd5d <201b60c4d15538fcc3c0c2ea9b75dd7d0f58022c || >=215e5fe75881a7e2425df04aeeed47a903d5cd5d <8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05 || 756c48bdf23050def518e85929be6edea9ae6823 || >=6.6.136 <6.6.145 || >=6.12.83 <6.12.97 || >=6.18.24 <6.18.40 || >=6.19.14 <6.20 | 7c6d2d2baeb1e62dc8c6951d27edc16c5ea6e3aa, a40e250414b463e953c54cd2a829c9a9a49a78c3, d34deef34c99bb4b3ebd2ac51058857827a20e7e, 201b60c4d15538fcc3c0c2ea9b75dd7d0f58022c, 8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 6.20 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.