Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72310 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72310 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <175357ee0c596cb82054650dfa32fda51ad35aaa || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <dbd126539c098dba3159ce7d34b10b2daddcbd0f || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <63feb687e89a3a52a31e6e01764117cc500f1974 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <160045fc943f6c46b227644261252c8a22b8a87a || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <b30771b69eafae750afb7385fbcc3d77ed3f3670 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <1627e7d5c9b09721a141d07cedb178882f1ded67 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <1a638c55f2db6cb2296e5e3138015dd8fd9d4aa9 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <a4f27ad055392fa164f5649e89a3637b033c5fcc || 2005c32ec99ee2490e8131b3953f3f212009ffea || >=5.4.69 <5.5 | 175357ee0c596cb82054650dfa32fda51ad35aaa, dbd126539c098dba3159ce7d34b10b2daddcbd0f, 63feb687e89a3a52a31e6e01764117cc500f1974, 160045fc943f6c46b227644261252c8a22b8a87a, b30771b69eafae750afb7385fbcc3d77ed3f3670, 1627e7d5c9b09721a141d07cedb178882f1ded67, 1a638c55f2db6cb2296e5e3138015dd8fd9d4aa9, a4f27ad055392fa164f5649e89a3637b033c5fcc, 5.5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer. Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <175357ee0c596cb82054650dfa32fda51ad35aaa || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <dbd126539c098dba3159ce7d34b10b2daddcbd0f || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <63feb687e89a3a52a31e6e01764117cc500f1974 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <160045fc943f6c46b227644261252c8a22b8a87a || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <b30771b69eafae750afb7385fbcc3d77ed3f3670 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <1627e7d5c9b09721a141d07cedb178882f1ded67 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <1a638c55f2db6cb2296e5e3138015dd8fd9d4aa9 || >=2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f <a4f27ad055392fa164f5649e89a3637b033c5fcc || 2005c32ec99ee2490e8131b3953f3f212009ffea || >=5.4.69 <5.5 | 175357ee0c596cb82054650dfa32fda51ad35aaa, dbd126539c098dba3159ce7d34b10b2daddcbd0f, 63feb687e89a3a52a31e6e01764117cc500f1974, 160045fc943f6c46b227644261252c8a22b8a87a, b30771b69eafae750afb7385fbcc3d77ed3f3670, 1627e7d5c9b09721a141d07cedb178882f1ded67, 1a638c55f2db6cb2296e5e3138015dd8fd9d4aa9, a4f27ad055392fa164f5649e89a3637b033c5fcc, 5.5 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer. Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.