Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72340 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1 || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041 || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 | 786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1, 49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc, 1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041, 952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b, d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.2 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72340 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1 || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041 || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b || >=71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 | 786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1, 49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc, 1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041, 952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b, d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.2 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.