Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72400 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72400 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <715eb12e453df752f1b4baaf972c3acff0ab9402 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <7247d05c987c3eec4bb7c2306dbd77ecdf3b7c73 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <071f1a38d7ddbadee29c09b9e3ee0ff3a61e6a0e || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <804bb969f194c93497ba632b98343794c6367fdc || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <0fc7069d39239978130c37ebceaec85c8948d3f1 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <8dba7a94a269b88e500aafc25ad567ef6a423698 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <c9961336aa5ff83092f23e33ee86666a9dbd1b2a || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <a75d99f46bf21b45965ce39c5cfb3b8bb5ffb1aa | 715eb12e453df752f1b4baaf972c3acff0ab9402, 7247d05c987c3eec4bb7c2306dbd77ecdf3b7c73, 071f1a38d7ddbadee29c09b9e3ee0ff3a61e6a0e, 804bb969f194c93497ba632b98343794c6367fdc, 0fc7069d39239978130c37ebceaec85c8948d3f1, 8dba7a94a269b88e500aafc25ad567ef6a423698, c9961336aa5ff83092f23e33ee86666a9dbd1b2a, a75d99f46bf21b45965ce39c5cfb3b8bb5ffb1aa |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <715eb12e453df752f1b4baaf972c3acff0ab9402 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <7247d05c987c3eec4bb7c2306dbd77ecdf3b7c73 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <071f1a38d7ddbadee29c09b9e3ee0ff3a61e6a0e || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <804bb969f194c93497ba632b98343794c6367fdc || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <0fc7069d39239978130c37ebceaec85c8948d3f1 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <8dba7a94a269b88e500aafc25ad567ef6a423698 || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <c9961336aa5ff83092f23e33ee86666a9dbd1b2a || >=fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 <a75d99f46bf21b45965ce39c5cfb3b8bb5ffb1aa | 715eb12e453df752f1b4baaf972c3acff0ab9402, 7247d05c987c3eec4bb7c2306dbd77ecdf3b7c73, 071f1a38d7ddbadee29c09b9e3ee0ff3a61e6a0e, 804bb969f194c93497ba632b98343794c6367fdc, 0fc7069d39239978130c37ebceaec85c8948d3f1, 8dba7a94a269b88e500aafc25ad567ef6a423698, c9961336aa5ff83092f23e33ee86666a9dbd1b2a, a75d99f46bf21b45965ce39c5cfb3b8bb5ffb1aa |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.