Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72418 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72418 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=460c112e1d887b58b06b56e8e0230058906ff2c3 <000ac6830b56499d6b65fd91486ce6689eb02be4 || >=53bc0ac47f4f7621c991807bc90e01df49561ac8 <cbe2d14a7c5b1fc71821fbfee5c4963917411e92 || >=ca8b4d1d6304a84ce2016fa2fe9a114b9607b839 <3793d24de224943e0a6016bbeffb6f5c4cea2e3d || >=8286c02fe9100330475331253fc590f047963f90 <abef7f817217fcb62c11821d6b895063eadb2828 || >=b29ddccf36946a90323486221f39e9f88cc01b8e <ebfe8249ba79e4ff0f1e3aad8787b992ef27f026 || >=77ea3d8ac3d3d59b5ac9ad639e4ba107c0f2ff1e <329f2626ee5cb8fafdf6b58b624311529c57cb45 || >=69894e5b4c5e28cda5f32af33d4a92b7a4b93b0e <be52572c6d55f677ba76869d3c63805c0d4891a3 || >=69894e5b4c5e28cda5f32af33d4a92b7a4b93b0e <c8b6f36f766991e3ebebec6596daee4b04dcbc49 || f85623af16b83615e5f64a9b19ae1d584805cb07 || >=5.10.248 <5.10.261 || >=5.15.198 <5.15.212 || >=6.1.160 <6.1.178 || >=6.6.120 <6.6.145 || >=6.12.63 <6.12.97 || >=6.18.2 <6.18.40 || >=6.17.13 <6.18 | 000ac6830b56499d6b65fd91486ce6689eb02be4, cbe2d14a7c5b1fc71821fbfee5c4963917411e92, 3793d24de224943e0a6016bbeffb6f5c4cea2e3d, abef7f817217fcb62c11821d6b895063eadb2828, ebfe8249ba79e4ff0f1e3aad8787b992ef27f026, 329f2626ee5cb8fafdf6b58b624311529c57cb45, be52572c6d55f677ba76869d3c63805c0d4891a3, c8b6f36f766991e3ebebec6596daee4b04dcbc49, 5.10.261, 5.15.212, 6.1.178, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 6.18 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.19 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct Commit 69894e5b4c5e ("netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add was skipped") introduced a regression where packets for valid connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting scenarios. The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add() assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST. Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection of the perfectly valid new connection. Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly. This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured locally to ensure we are not breaking soft-limiting scenarios for local or external connections. In addition, it was tested with a OVS zone limit too.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=460c112e1d887b58b06b56e8e0230058906ff2c3 <000ac6830b56499d6b65fd91486ce6689eb02be4 || >=53bc0ac47f4f7621c991807bc90e01df49561ac8 <cbe2d14a7c5b1fc71821fbfee5c4963917411e92 || >=ca8b4d1d6304a84ce2016fa2fe9a114b9607b839 <3793d24de224943e0a6016bbeffb6f5c4cea2e3d || >=8286c02fe9100330475331253fc590f047963f90 <abef7f817217fcb62c11821d6b895063eadb2828 || >=b29ddccf36946a90323486221f39e9f88cc01b8e <ebfe8249ba79e4ff0f1e3aad8787b992ef27f026 || >=77ea3d8ac3d3d59b5ac9ad639e4ba107c0f2ff1e <329f2626ee5cb8fafdf6b58b624311529c57cb45 || >=69894e5b4c5e28cda5f32af33d4a92b7a4b93b0e <be52572c6d55f677ba76869d3c63805c0d4891a3 || >=69894e5b4c5e28cda5f32af33d4a92b7a4b93b0e <c8b6f36f766991e3ebebec6596daee4b04dcbc49 || f85623af16b83615e5f64a9b19ae1d584805cb07 || >=5.10.248 <5.10.261 || >=5.15.198 <5.15.212 || >=6.1.160 <6.1.178 || >=6.6.120 <6.6.145 || >=6.12.63 <6.12.97 || >=6.18.2 <6.18.40 || >=6.17.13 <6.18 | 000ac6830b56499d6b65fd91486ce6689eb02be4, cbe2d14a7c5b1fc71821fbfee5c4963917411e92, 3793d24de224943e0a6016bbeffb6f5c4cea2e3d, abef7f817217fcb62c11821d6b895063eadb2828, ebfe8249ba79e4ff0f1e3aad8787b992ef27f026, 329f2626ee5cb8fafdf6b58b624311529c57cb45, be52572c6d55f677ba76869d3c63805c0d4891a3, c8b6f36f766991e3ebebec6596daee4b04dcbc49, 5.10.261, 5.15.212, 6.1.178, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 6.18 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.19 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 15, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 15, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct Commit 69894e5b4c5e ("netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add was skipped") introduced a regression where packets for valid connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting scenarios. The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add() assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST. Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection of the perfectly valid new connection. Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly. This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured locally to ensure we are not breaking soft-limiting scenarios for local or external connections. In addition, it was tested with a OVS zone limit too.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.