Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72718 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in goose: Arbitrary command execution in goose CLI via `goose review` via git core.fsmonitor. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps aaif-goose/goose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps aaif-goose/goose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| aaif-goose/goosegeneric | < 1.44.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 10, 2026
goose is general-purpose AI agent that runs on your machine. Prior to 1.44.0, the `goose review` command runs the system `git` executable to gather the diff for review without stripping attacker-controlled Git configuration. A malicious repository whose `.git/config` sets [`core] fsmonitor = <command>` causes Git to execute that command on the host during the index refresh performed by `git diff HEAD`. The command runs before goose contacts a model and without a submitted prompt, model call, tool approval, or trust prompt. The context-gathering Git process is not sandboxed and is outside goose's tool-permission model. Arbitrary commands run with the privileges and environment of the user running goose, allowing file access or modification and exfiltration of environment secrets and provider API keys. The vulnerable Git invocations are built by git_command() in crates/goose-cli/src/commands/review/handler.rs and are used by touched_files() and collect_diff() for `git diff --name-only HEAD` and `git diff HEAD`. This issue is fixed in version 1.44.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-72718 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in goose: Arbitrary command execution in goose CLI via `goose review` via git core.fsmonitor. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps aaif-goose/goose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps aaif-goose/goose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| aaif-goose/goosegeneric | < 1.44.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 10, 2026
goose is general-purpose AI agent that runs on your machine. Prior to 1.44.0, the `goose review` command runs the system `git` executable to gather the diff for review without stripping attacker-controlled Git configuration. A malicious repository whose `.git/config` sets [`core] fsmonitor = <command>` causes Git to execute that command on the host during the index refresh performed by `git diff HEAD`. The command runs before goose contacts a model and without a submitted prompt, model call, tool approval, or trust prompt. The context-gathering Git process is not sandboxed and is outside goose's tool-permission model. Arbitrary commands run with the privileges and environment of the user running goose, allowing file access or modification and exfiltration of environment secrets and provider API keys. The vulnerable Git invocations are built by git_command() in crates/goose-cli/src/commands/review/handler.rs and are used by touched_files() and collect_diff() for `git diff --name-only HEAD` and `git diff HEAD`. This issue is fixed in version 1.44.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.