Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant payload poisoning via packet write + replay (CVE-2026-73657) | HOL Guard CVE

Medium · CVSS 4.2CVE-2026-73657

Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant payload poisoning via packet write + replay

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-73657 records a Medium severity (CVSS 4.2) vulnerability in Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant payload poisoning via packet write + replay. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps triggerdotdev/trigger.dev (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 13, 2026Updated Sep 8, 2026Source checked Sep 28, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 13, 2026Material review Sep 8, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Medium · CVSS 4.2
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 4.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps triggerdotdev/trigger.dev (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
triggerdotdev/trigger.devgeneric	>= 4.4.2, < 4.5.0-rc.4	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for triggerdotdev/trigger.dev.
Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Aug 13, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Aug 13, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 4.4.2 until 4.5.0-rc.4, `POST /api/v1/runs/:runParam/replay` in apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.runs.$runParam.replay.ts uses `prisma.taskRun.findUnique({ where: { friendlyId: runParam } })` without a runtimeEnvironmentId filter, then ReplayTaskRunService in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/replayTaskRun.server.ts replays the selected run in the victim environment. Any valid environment API key can therefore replay another tenant's run by friendlyId, consuming victim resources and repeating side effects; when `payloadType: "application/store"` is used, overrideExistingPayloadPacket() calls conditionallyImportPacket() on existingTaskRun.payload without an integrity check, so payload bytes overwritten through a separate object-store path-traversal vulnerability become attacker-controlled input to the victim task. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0-rc.4.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.