Answer in brief
CVE-2026-74635 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=0998a6cb232674408a03e8561dc15aa266b2f53b <250159ace2dc53c1bdad267aa8da51b638748700 || >=db5c9a162d2f42bcc842b76b3d935dcc050a0eec <46336f476484f36145e5117e72d7b590f47433ee || >=c12003bf91fdff381c55ef54fef3e961a5af2545 <bf750cfeacf4e47ac72dadc7f05839696efb8576 || >=9ba1a7802ca9a2590cef95b253e6526f4364477f <94134d70abf9273b70499d97d0adc9185ef21091 || >=901f44227072be60812fe8083e83e1533c04eed1 <c1e7351767dd30fc574395c82121e4c67b882da3 || >=18c4ef4e765a798b47980555ed665d78b71aeadf <bc9db0d879c655d5dfd8add32fd60f13e65d132c || >=18c4ef4e765a798b47980555ed665d78b71aeadf <9ea879862e66e354e616028c31b39aa3eb6d35d8 || >=18c4ef4e765a798b47980555ed665d78b71aeadf <e033cbf3975a8465f879ebd5989dc35b04423a4d || a10cede006f9614b465cf25609a8753efbfd45cc || efaf89a75a29b2d179bf4fe63ca62852e93ad620 || >=5.10.247 <5.10.265 || >=5.15.197 <5.15.216 || >=6.1.159 <6.1.183 || >=6.6.117 <6.6.152 || >=6.12.58 <6.12.104 || >=5.4.302 <5.5 || >=6.17.8 <6.18 | 250159ace2dc53c1bdad267aa8da51b638748700, 46336f476484f36145e5117e72d7b590f47433ee, bf750cfeacf4e47ac72dadc7f05839696efb8576, 94134d70abf9273b70499d97d0adc9185ef21091, c1e7351767dd30fc574395c82121e4c67b882da3, bc9db0d879c655d5dfd8add32fd60f13e65d132c, 9ea879862e66e354e616028c31b39aa3eb6d35d8, e033cbf3975a8465f879ebd5989dc35b04423a4d, 5.10.265, 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.6.152, 6.12.104, 5.5, 6.18 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.18 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 22, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 22, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor() bit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with c = scr_readw(vc_pos); src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height); where charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer value comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current font's glyph count. Syzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows vcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with writev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via vcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later read in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c. When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with 256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same out-of-bounds access. BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970 Call Trace: soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365 fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427 hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883 update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669 vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685 bit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata. The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*"), which missed the cursor path. This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in con_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits remains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without changing cursor semantics — the same fallback bit_putcs uses.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.