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  4. CVE 2026 74691 net thunderbolt tear down dma paths before
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Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
High ยท CVSS 8.8CVE-2026-74691

net: thunderbolt: Tear down DMA paths before stopping the ringsCVE-2026-74691

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-74691 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in net: thunderbolt: Tear down DMA paths before stopping the rings. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 22, 2026Updated Aug 25, 2026Source checked Oct 7, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 22, 2026Material review Aug 25, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 7, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
High ยท CVSS 8.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <7cce39109206bc5497e0953806563644b88bfc44 || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <0da9a6d27155ad072dd76db8cd637feead99a0e0 || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <b5a21615f627c48dafaa6ef82a34a5b97a4352aa || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <103a9b663ac1cacb8465aeff18f84a247154a562 || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <4dd71cb0d23d40cb58fe4261c7bd183dca66caa0 || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <9a482b2b117e5fa656b6d24fc01799e8ac2d4368 || >=e69b6c02b4c3b8d03be7136f90dd9551ad5a5a5e <68bf02b6b4ad3f748c6db71fd77b6c0402d252f47cce39109206bc5497e0953806563644b88bfc44, 0da9a6d27155ad072dd76db8cd637feead99a0e0, b5a21615f627c48dafaa6ef82a34a5b97a4352aa, 103a9b663ac1cacb8465aeff18f84a247154a562, 4dd71cb0d23d40cb58fe4261c7bd183dca66caa0, 9a482b2b117e5fa656b6d24fc01799e8ac2d4368, 68bf02b6b4ad3f748c6db71fd77b6c0402d252f4
Linux/Linuxgeneric4.15Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 7cce39109206bc5497e0953806563644b88bfc44 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 22, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Aug 25, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 22, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Tear down DMA paths before stopping the rings tbnet_tear_down() stops both rings and frees their frame buffers before calling tb_xdomain_disable_paths(). tb_ring_stop() zeroes the ring's descriptor base and tbnet_free_buffers() unmaps and frees the pages the frames sit in, so by the time __tb_path_deactivate_hop() polls the hop's 'pending' bit, anything still in flight has nowhere to drain to. The teardown sequence has been in this order since the driver was added. The setup path has not: commit ff7cd07f3064 ("net: thunderbolt: Enable DMA paths only after rings are enabled") moved the path enable to the end of tbnet_connected_work() and documented why: /* Both logins successful so enable the rings, high-speed DMA * paths and start the network device queue. * * Note we enable the DMA paths last to make sure we have primed * the Rx ring before any incoming packets are allowed to * arrive. */ Teardown was never updated to match, so the rings and the paths now come down in the same order they go up instead of in reverse. On an ASMedia ASM4242 host router the 'pending' bit then never clears: every teardown burns the full 500 ms timeout and __tb_path_deactivate_hop() returns -ETIMEDOUT. Raising the timeout to 5 s does not help, so the hop is not slow to drain, it never drains at all. The failure is invisible above the thunderbolt core. __tb_path_deactivate_hops() is void and only calls tb_port_warn(); tb_path_deactivate(), tb_tunnel_deactivate() and __tb_disconnect_xdomain_paths() are void as well, and tb_disconnect_xdomain_paths() ends in an unconditional "return 0". So tb_xdomain_disable_paths() reports success and the netdev_warn() below it never fires. Repeated teardowns eventually take the XDomain control channel down, after which the peer node is gone and only a power cycle brings the controller back. Deactivating the paths first fixes it. Measured with kretprobes on a stock v6.17 tree with no other patches applied, on a link that was up and had just carried traffic: before: __tb_path_deactivate_hop() returns 0 for the first hop, then -ETIMEDOUT for the second 500335 us later after: 0 for both, 525 us apart Alternating the two orderings ABBA over three load levels, four teardowns per arm: every teardown failed before the change (21 of 21 that ran), none failed after (0 of 24). The before arms ran short because the link died partway through. The same split shows up when the interface is enslaved to a bond instead of just brought down, which is how I ran into this in the first place. Throughput and latency after the change are unchanged. Hosts whose routers drain the hop despite the stale descriptor base see no functional difference, since the paths end up deactivated either way.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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