Answer in brief
CVE-2026-74837 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Unbounded atom creation from client-supplied RPC field names in AshTypescript field formatter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_typescript (generic), ash-project/ash_typescript (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash_typescript (generic), ash-project/ash_typescript (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ash_typescriptgeneric | >=0.1.0 <0.18.0 | 0.18.0 |
| ash-project/ash_typescriptgeneric | >=1a3d4c343430c8e4784acfcd33122a807fafa086 <df95df4b9afdca5e5bbce32dbd566ccc49a7f14b | df95df4b9afdca5e5bbce32dbd566ccc49a7f14b |
Published upstream
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 1, 2026
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the BEAM atom table and abort the node via client-supplied RPC field names. AshTypescript.FieldFormatter.convert_to_field_atom/2 in lib/ash_typescript/field_formatter.ex converts a client-supplied field name to an atom with String.to_atom/1 when no matching atom already exists. It delegates first to parse_input_field/2, which resolves the name with String.to_existing_atom/1 and falls back to returning the plain string; convert_to_field_atom/2 then mints an atom from that string rather than treating the name as unknown. RPC field selection reaches it for every requested field name through AshTypescript.Rpc.FieldProcessing.FieldSelector, which resolves each name before checking that the field exists, with no allowlist, length bound, or rate limit. Atoms are never garbage collected, so each distinct name mints a permanent one and the VM aborts once the atom table limit is reached. A field name over 255 characters additionally raises an uncaught SystemLimitError. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.1.0 before 0.18.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.