Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75856 records a Critical severity (CVSS 8.6) vulnerability in CodeWhale before 0.8.64 SSRF Bypass via DNS Pinning TOCTOU. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps codewhale-tui (crates.io), deepseek-tui (crates.io), Hmbown/CodeWhale (generic), Hmbown/CodeWhale (generic) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.6. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps codewhale-tui (crates.io), deepseek-tui (crates.io), Hmbown/CodeWhale (generic), Hmbown/CodeWhale (generic) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| codewhale-tuicrates.io | >=0.8.41 <0.8.64 | 0.8.64 |
| deepseek-tuicrates.io | >=0.8.5 | Not reported |
| Hmbown/CodeWhalegeneric | >=0.8.41 <0.8.64 | 0.8.64 |
| Hmbown/CodeWhalegeneric | >=0.8.5 <0.8.41 | 0.8.41 |
| codewhalenpm | >=0.8.41 <0.8.64 | 0.8.64 |
| codewhalenpm | >=0.8.41,<0.8.64 | 0.8.64 |
| deepseek-tuinpm | >=0.8.5,<0.8.41 | 0.8.41 |
| deepseek-tuinpm | >=0.8.5 <0.8.41 | 0.8.41 |
| codewhale-tuirust | >=0.8.41,<0.8.64 | 0.8.64 |
| deepseek-tuirust | >=0.8.5,<=0.8.41 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 18, 2026
CodeWhale before 0.8.64 contains a server-side request forgery bypass vulnerability in DNS pinning logic that fails to prevent time-of-check-time-of-use attacks. Attackers can manipulate DNS responses to fail initial resolution checks and succeed on secondary requests, allowing requests to internal IP addresses and bypassing SSRF mitigations.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.