Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75926 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Hugo 0.162.0 to 0.164.x - Node Permission Model Bypass via Default TailwindCSS Child-Process Grant. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75926 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Hugo 0.162.0 to 0.164.x - Node Permission Model Bypass via Default TailwindCSS Child-Process Grant. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gohugoio/hugogeneric | >=0.162.0 <0.165.0 | 0.165.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 18, 2026
Hugo 0.161.0 placed the Node asset pipelines behind the Node.js permission model so that code running through PostCSS, Babel, or TailwindCSS could not reach the file system outside the project directory. Hugo 0.162.0 added tailwindcss to the AllowChildProcess default in config/security/securityConfig.go, which makes nodePermissionArgs in common/hexec/exec.go append --allow-child-process whenever the tool being launched is named tailwindcss. TailwindCSS loads the site's tailwind.config.js through require at startup, so top-level code in that file executes inside the permitted Node process and can call child_process to spawn a shell. The spawned process is not a Node process and inherits none of the permission flags, so it runs with the full privileges of the account performing the build. Building a site whose theme, module, or starter template supplies the Tailwind configuration therefore yields arbitrary command execution rather than the confined file access the permission model was introduced to enforce. Hugo 0.165.0 removes tailwindcss from the default security.exec.allow list, so the tool is no longer launched under the default configuration.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gohugoio/hugogeneric | >=0.162.0 <0.165.0 | 0.165.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 18, 2026
Hugo 0.161.0 placed the Node asset pipelines behind the Node.js permission model so that code running through PostCSS, Babel, or TailwindCSS could not reach the file system outside the project directory. Hugo 0.162.0 added tailwindcss to the AllowChildProcess default in config/security/securityConfig.go, which makes nodePermissionArgs in common/hexec/exec.go append --allow-child-process whenever the tool being launched is named tailwindcss. TailwindCSS loads the site's tailwind.config.js through require at startup, so top-level code in that file executes inside the permitted Node process and can call child_process to spawn a shell. The spawned process is not a Node process and inherits none of the permission flags, so it runs with the full privileges of the account performing the build. Building a site whose theme, module, or starter template supplies the Tailwind configuration therefore yields arbitrary command execution rather than the confined file access the permission model was introduced to enforce. Hugo 0.165.0 removes tailwindcss from the default security.exec.allow list, so the tool is no longer launched under the default configuration.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.