Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75927 records a High severity (CVSS 7.2) vulnerability in PublishPress Capabilities <= 2.50.0 - Authenticated (Editor+) Privilege Escalation to Fresh-Install Default Capability Grant. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Roles (generic), publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Roles (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Roles (generic), publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Roles (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Rolesgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
| publishpress/User Role Editor – PublishPress Capabilities: Access Control and User Rolesgeneric | >=0 <=2.50.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 9, 2026
The PublishPress Capabilities – User Role Editor, Access Permissions, User Capabilities, Admin Menus plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.50.0. This is due to the `addPluginCapabilities()` function unconditionally granting the Editor role all 15 `manage_capabilities_*` capabilities — including `manage_capabilities`, `manage_capabilities_roles`, `manage_capabilities_settings`, and `manage_capabilities_backup` — via a hard-coded `$eligible_roles = ['administrator', 'editor']` assignment that runs automatically on the first `admin_init` after plugin activation with no administrator opt-in, persisting the grants directly to the database. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Editor-level access to elevate their privileges to a site-wide capability manager, enabling them to create, rename, and delete non-system roles, modify capabilities of non-administrator roles, restore role backups, and write arbitrary plugin options whose names begin with `cme_`, `capsman`, `pp_capabilities`, or `presspermit` via `update_option()`. The escalation stops short of full Administrator access, as WordPress's `map_meta_cap` layer still prevents the escalated Editor from granting administrator-only capabilities to other roles; however, all role-management and plugin-settings functionality gated solely on `manage_capabilities_*` capabilities remains fully accessible.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.