Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75980 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in BetterDocs <= 4.8.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Heading 'id' Attribute in Post Content. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps wpdevteam/BetterDocs – AI Documentation, Knowledge Base, MCP Server, Docs, Wikis, FAQ & Chatbot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps wpdevteam/BetterDocs – AI Documentation, Knowledge Base, MCP Server, Docs, Wikis, FAQ & Chatbot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| wpdevteam/BetterDocs – AI Documentation, Knowledge Base, MCP Server, Docs, Wikis, FAQ & Chatbotgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 1, 2026
The BetterDocs – AI Documentation, Knowledge Base, Docs, Wikis, FAQ with Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Heading 'id' Attribute in Post Content in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The exploit survives wp_kses_post because entity-encoded quotes in a heading id attribute are treated as a single legitimate attribute value at save time; the dangerous payload only materialises after process_content_for_toc() calls html_entity_decode() on the stored content and the broken id is extracted by a lazy regex before being echoed unescaped into the Table of Contents output.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.