Answer in brief
CVE-2026-75981 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation <= 3.2.5 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps cozmoslabs/TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps cozmoslabs/TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| cozmoslabs/TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translationgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 19, 2026
The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers '#!trpst#' and '#!trpen#' are unconditionally rewritten to '<' and '>' by translate_page() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wp_kses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker's '#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#' into a real <img> tag. remove_tags_from_output() only strips <script>/<style>, so an <img onerror=...> executes in the visitor's browser.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.