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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.0CVE-2026-78118

Race condition on kernel wait queues: unlocked z_waitq_head() read in the timer expiration handler can yield a stale or sentinel thread pointer on SMPCVE-2026-78118

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-78118 records a High severity (CVSS 7.0) vulnerability in Race condition on kernel wait queues: unlocked z_waitq_head() read in the timer expiration handler can yield a stale or sentinel thread pointer on SMP. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps zephyrproject/zephyr (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 21, 2026Updated Oct 21, 2026Source checked Oct 21, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 21, 2026Material review Oct 21, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.0
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps zephyrproject/zephyr (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
zephyrproject/zephyrgeneric>=2.2.0 <4.5.04.5.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for zephyrproject/zephyr.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update zephyrproject/zephyr to 4.5.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 21, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 21, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 21, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive. When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer. The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data. Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • Out-of-bounds read in Bluetooth Classic A2DP codec information element handlingSame zephyrproject/zephyr package
  • PECI transfer syscall verifier does not validate embedded user buffer pointers, allowing arbitrary kernel memory read/write from user modeSame zephyrproject/zephyr package
  • Missing kernel object permission check in devmux syscalls allows unprivileged user threads to retarget a device multiplexerSame zephyrproject/zephyr package
  • Double free of an RTIO submission in the Broadcom AFBR-S50 sensor driver data-evaluation error pathSame zephyrproject/zephyr package
  • Race condition on shared HCI TX descriptor in the Infineon PSOC 6 BLESS Bluetooth driver can leak adjacent memory over the airSame zephyrproject/zephyr package
  • Out-of-bounds write in the Nuvoton NPCX eSPI Target-Attached-Flash receive path from an unvalidated host-supplied packet lengthSame zephyrproject/zephyr package

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-362
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 21, 2026
References
2 linked sources
Open source record