Answer in brief
CVE-2026-78216 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in AshLua eval read operations can read field-policy-protected fields via aggregates. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ash-project/ash_lua (generic), ash-project/ash_lua (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ash-project/ash_lua (generic), ash-project/ash_lua (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project/ash_luageneric | >=0.1.0 <0.2.2 | 0.2.2 |
| ash-project/ash_luageneric | >=8675e47cca81f36594083a7e63379bac9e123e72 <266a5dcc56d5015b6d316c10606169e753b07450 | 266a5dcc56d5015b6d316c10606169e753b07450 |
Published upstream
Sep 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 8, 2026
AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.