Answer in brief
CVE-2026-7830 records a High severity (CVSS 7.4) vulnerability in UltraVNC MS-Logon II uses 64-bit Diffie-Hellman and seeded libc rand() enabling credential interception. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps uvnc/UltraVNC (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps uvnc/UltraVNC (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| uvnc/UltraVNCgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jul 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses inadequate cryptography in the MS-Logon II authentication scheme (rfbUltraVNC_MsLogonIIAuth). In rfb/dh.cpp the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is performed with parameters that fit in an unsigned 64-bit integer (DH_MAX_BITS controls the prime size). A 64-bit DH key can be broken by Pollard's rho algorithm in under one second on current hardware. Additionally, the private exponent is generated by the rng() function, which multiplies three libc rand() values seeded from time(NULL). With approximately 31 bits of internal state and a time-based seed, the private exponent is recoverable in under a minute by a passive observer. A network attacker who can observe the MS-Logon II handshake (via sniffing, recording, or man-in-the-middle) can derive the shared DH key and decrypt the encapsulated username and password, resulting in full credential disclosure. This affects legacy MS-Logon II connections; MS-Logon III (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) is unaffected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-7830 records a High severity (CVSS 7.4) vulnerability in UltraVNC MS-Logon II uses 64-bit Diffie-Hellman and seeded libc rand() enabling credential interception. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps uvnc/UltraVNC (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps uvnc/UltraVNC (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| uvnc/UltraVNCgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jul 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jul 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses inadequate cryptography in the MS-Logon II authentication scheme (rfbUltraVNC_MsLogonIIAuth). In rfb/dh.cpp the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is performed with parameters that fit in an unsigned 64-bit integer (DH_MAX_BITS controls the prime size). A 64-bit DH key can be broken by Pollard's rho algorithm in under one second on current hardware. Additionally, the private exponent is generated by the rng() function, which multiplies three libc rand() values seeded from time(NULL). With approximately 31 bits of internal state and a time-based seed, the private exponent is recoverable in under a minute by a passive observer. A network attacker who can observe the MS-Logon II handshake (via sniffing, recording, or man-in-the-middle) can derive the shared DH key and decrypt the encapsulated username and password, resulting in full credential disclosure. This affects legacy MS-Logon II connections; MS-Logon III (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) is unaffected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.