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  4. CVE 2026 78619 punkplugintotp versions before 005 for perl
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-78619

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numericallyCVE-2026-78619

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-78619 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Punk-TOTP (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 25, 2026Updated Aug 26, 2026Source checked Oct 10, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 25, 2026Material review Aug 26, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-305, CWE-1025
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 10, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Punk-TOTP (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Punk-TOTPgeneric>=0 <0.050.05

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Punk-TOTP.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Source-reported solution: Upgrade to Punk-TOTP 0.05 or later.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 25, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Aug 26, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 25, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencemetacpan.org
  • Source referencemetacpan.org
  • Source referencemetacpan.org
  • Source referenceopenwall.com
Upstream source description

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically. The helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended. The challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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