Answer in brief
CVE-2026-80218 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic), team-alembic/ash_authentication (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic/ash_authenticationgeneric | >=3.10.5 <4.15.0 || >=5.0.0-rc.0 <5.0.0-rc.14 | 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14 |
| team-alembic/ash_authenticationgeneric | >=eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269 <* | * |
Published upstream
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 17, 2026
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.