Answer in brief
CVE-2026-80545 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=e2c6d91eb8b1533753755f07803e47eceed263d0 <2976b9d2e716c7e5487ca7c29a7bd076cf9adf08 || >=e2c6d91eb8b1533753755f07803e47eceed263d0 <17ac0bc866fc624cd05f022dcd8b730c0af11bb1 | 2976b9d2e716c7e5487ca7c29a7bd076cf9adf08, 17ac0bc866fc624cd05f022dcd8b730c0af11bb1 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.1 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 26, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 26, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks The xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities: 1. Missing minimum size validation: The ep11_cprb structure and subsequent payload fields (pld_tag, pld_lenfmt) are copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length. 2. Arithmetic overflow in length calculations: CEIL4 alignment could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows. 3. The payload is asn1 encoded but the function just uses a simple c struct overlay to access some fields of the payload. Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary checks after alignment, and validating minimum request size and minimum reply size before copying from userspace. Do a very simple asn1 parsing of the payload up to the function value field.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.