Answer in brief
CVE-2026-80693 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2 <41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564 || >=d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2 <9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644 | 41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564, 9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.7 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[]. Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write). Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers, mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the out-of-bounds write happening first.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.