HOL LogoGuard

Explore HOL

  • HOL home
  • AI agent registry
  • AI plugins
  • Open standards
  • HOL members
  • Sponsor HOL
  • Advertise with HOL

Guard product

  • Guard overviewLocal security and control for AI agents and the tools they use.
  • FeaturesRuntime protection, policy routing, review, and evidence.

Explore Guard

  • Product previewWalk through Guard surfaces in read-only demo mode.
  • ComparisonCompare Guard with native controls and AI security vendors.

AI tools

  • All AI toolsEvery supported AI tool and how Guard applies policy to it.
  • Codex
  • Claude Code
  • Cursor
  • Antigravity CLI
  • OpenCode
  • Hermes
  • OpenClaw
  • GitHub Copilot CLI
  • Antigravity
  • Kimi
  • Grok
  • Pi / Oh My Pi
  • Zcode

Extensions

  • All extensionsBrowse command and MCP coverage with owners and stated limits.
  • Command coverageShell command protection across clouds, databases, backups, and packages.
  • MCP server coverageSee how Guard maps risk state across MCP tools and servers.
  • Core safetyThe safety floor listings that ship with Guard.
  • Data and resilienceBackup and storage command protection.
  • Cloud and infrastructureAWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and more.

Security

  • AI security hubSecurity research, advisories, and agent safety coverage.
  • AI tool securitySecurity profiles for each supported coding agent.
  • Safe labsHands-on attack simulations with safe boundaries.
  • Redacted warningsReal blocked actions with sensitive details removed.
  • AdvisoriesCoordinated disclosure reports for AI tooling.
  • Active CVEsSearch active CVEs affecting AI tooling.

Learn

  • Security guidesPractical guides for securing AI agent workflows.
  • DocsInstall, configure, and operate Guard with confidence.
  • ResearchPublished security research, benchmarks, and methodology.

Community

  • ReleasesVersion history, shipped changes and upgrade notes.
  • ContributorsThe people and contributions behind HOL Guard.
  • AffiliatesShare Guard with your audience and earn from referrals.
  • SponsorFund agreed research, implementation and shared testing through the HOL Partner Program.
  • AdvertiseCompare README logo placements, previews and monthly prices, or promote a plugin or extension.
PricingEnterpriseOpen AppInstall Guard
  1. Guard
  2. Security
  3. CVEs
  4. CVE 2026 80772 hid nintendo fix out of bounds read in
HOL Guard

Public security guidance for teams protecting AI harnesses, MCP servers, skills, prompts, and local tool execution.

Install Guard

AI Security

  • Prompt injection
  • MCP security
  • OWASP MCP mapping
  • Supply chain

Resources

  • Trust packet
  • Harness setup
  • Redacted warnings
  • Safe labs

Product

  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
  • Open dashboard
Guard
  • Guard Overview
  • Releases
  • Contributors
  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
Docs
  • Documentation Index
  • Developer Hub
  • API Reference
  • Root OpenAPI
  • Registry OpenAPI
  • Run in Postman
  • Standards
  • Submit ERC-8004 Contract
  • Feature Your Agent
Best Plugins
  • Browse Plugins
  • Plugin Launches
  • Best Claude Plugins
  • Best Codex Plugins
  • Best Grok Plugins
  • Best Kimi Plugins
  • Best DeepSeek Plugins
  • Best Antigravity Plugins
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best Cursor Plugins
  • Best OpenCode Plugins
Best Agents
  • Best ERC-8004 Agents
  • Best Virtuals Agents
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best A2A Agents
  • Best x402 Payable
  • All Categories
Community
  • Telegram
  • X
More
  • About HOL
  • Sponsor
  • Advertise
  • Contact
  • Blog
  • GitHub
  • Privacy
  • Terms of Service
Settings

Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity ยท Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-80772

HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()CVE-2026-80772

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-80772 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 4, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 19, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 4, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 19, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0 || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172 || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <addca61f9a23c0d20a387c2040e70479f54518e1 || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <51cfd1adbe7a46bb08af162abb3ab3b6820e2d15 || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <d4cabd4089adb59cf7974915737c52cc47a9bb1b || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <34725ed4719da424113db8449fb5485aaf71a913 || >=2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a <27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b55733ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0, bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172, addca61f9a23c0d20a387c2040e70479f54518e1, 51cfd1adbe7a46bb08af162abb3ab3b6820e2d15, d4cabd4089adb59cf7974915737c52cc47a9bb1b, 34725ed4719da424113db8449fb5485aaf71a913, 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.16Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 4, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 4, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.