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Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity ยท Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-80784

mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown raceCVE-2026-80784

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-80784 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown race. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 4, 2026Updated Sep 4, 2026Source checked Oct 19, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 4, 2026Material review Sep 4, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <f48341830e4202db3fe884b819b2db6740f0537d || >=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <bb32e9a6a9a9f99eeda16c4efe443400f3e43892 || >=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <b2a0b55bf613bd3e81ed26a847b0f6b8e6b7f804 || >=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <9fe5eebb664ecdba88f3fde18062d94b1d1c465f || >=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <6c290915a03fc8228b473641025cf762b256dbd2 || >=9ab4807c84a4aacfc9b4f79cc81254035e0ec361 <efc33b5102ff859bacd390a5f30112d8e0c084c0f48341830e4202db3fe884b819b2db6740f0537d, bb32e9a6a9a9f99eeda16c4efe443400f3e43892, b2a0b55bf613bd3e81ed26a847b0f6b8e6b7f804, 9fe5eebb664ecdba88f3fde18062d94b1d1c465f, 6c290915a03fc8228b473641025cf762b256dbd2, efc33b5102ff859bacd390a5f30112d8e0c084c0
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.19Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to f48341830e4202db3fe884b819b2db6740f0537d if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 4, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 4, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 4, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown race mptcp_pm_destroy() empties msk->pm.anno_list and msk->pm.userspace_pm_local_addr_list under msk->pm.lock during socket teardown, dropping the lock between the two. A concurrent userspace PM genl ANNOUNCE on the same msk holds a sock reference via mptcp_token_get_sock() and, in mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit(), calls mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr() and mptcp_pm_announced_alloc(). Both take msk->pm.lock briefly to add to their respective lists. Because the genl handler holds a sock reference, mptcp_pm_destroy() may run on the same msk via mptcp_disconnect(), which invokes mptcp_destroy_common() without dropping the sock refcount, before the handler completes. If the lock acquisitions interleave such that mptcp_pm_destroy() empties a list first, the later alloc adds its entry to a list head that nothing else iterates for this msk, and the entry leaks. kmemleak reports both mptcp_pm_add_addr objects (from mptcp_pm_announced_alloc()) and mptcp_pm_addr_entry objects (from mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr()) under sustained concurrent ANNOUNCE + close load against the userspace PM. Add an MPTCP_PM_DESTROYING bit in msk->pm.status, set by mptcp_pm_destroy() under pm.lock before the lists are emptied and checked under pm.lock by the alloc paths. Either the alloc takes pm.lock first, in which case its entry is on the list when mptcp_pm_destroy() frees it; or mptcp_pm_destroy() takes pm.lock first, in which case the later alloc observes the bit and refuses. Found by an MPTCP protocol-flow harness extending BRF (arXiv:2305.08782).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Secret Exfiltration
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 19, 2026
References
6 linked sources
Open source record