Answer in brief
CVE-2026-80869 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669 <c7a7e48e71ce915ec4cbd6e9f355590c1ecbc29a || >=1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669 <98634df5b1cb56c26299b7409227025ddb0167d8 | c7a7e48e71ce915ec4cbd6e9f355590c1ecbc29a, 98634df5b1cb56c26299b7409227025ddb0167d8 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 7.1 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 4, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount() The $MFT attribute-list walk in ntfs_read_inode_mount() validates each entry only with "(u8 *)al_entry + 6 > al_end" and "(u8 *)al_entry + le16_to_cpu(al_entry->length) > al_end", but then reads al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and al_entry->mft_reference (offset 16) -- fields beyond the 6 bytes proven in range. al_entry->length is attacker-controlled and only required non-zero, so a short entry (e.g. length 8) placed at the tail passes both checks while the lowest_vcn / mft_reference reads fall past al_end. al_end is ni->attr_list + attr_list_size (the on-disk size); the buffer is kvzalloc(round_up(attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE)), so the sector rounding usually absorbs the over-read -- but when attr_list_size is a multiple of SECTOR_SIZE there is no slack and a crafted $MFT attribute list produces an out-of-bounds read at mount time. Validate the entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch 1/3) before dereferencing it, matching the bound the other attribute-list walks now use. The validator already requires the length to cover the fixed header, which makes the separate "!al_entry->length" check redundant, so drop it too.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.