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  4. CVE 2026 80976 seg6 reset ip6cb after ipv6 decapsulation
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-80976

seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulationCVE-2026-80976

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-80976 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 11, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 27, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 11, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <2b154e96fcb3f01fd42765c64e0a56820fbc16eb || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <cfa186a0857a0f831dfca67b16bbc40ecfdf3280 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <c73fb911e02b9a766c950bc9707f3e3a96ffd702 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9f2b154e96fcb3f01fd42765c64e0a56820fbc16eb, cfa186a0857a0f831dfca67b16bbc40ecfdf3280, c73fb911e02b9a766c950bc9707f3e3a96ffd702, f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9f
Linux/Linuxgeneric4.14Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <d1f0d353358987ca87f21d8956e2d2854951130d || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <a0e2b0a3718f0cf9fb0ee41710b4a6348a7315c8 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <9ae92198c24d7dacd4070e2f34f6e1ed3a63061c || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <96c74420ac92930a7e0f21770818544eee4a93d7 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <2b154e96fcb3f01fd42765c64e0a56820fbc16eb || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <cfa186a0857a0f831dfca67b16bbc40ecfdf3280 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <c73fb911e02b9a766c950bc9707f3e3a96ffd702 || >=d7a669dd2f8ba07a17423f4ad586dfc0379882f7 <f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9fd1f0d353358987ca87f21d8956e2d2854951130d, a0e2b0a3718f0cf9fb0ee41710b4a6348a7315c8, 9ae92198c24d7dacd4070e2f34f6e1ed3a63061c, 96c74420ac92930a7e0f21770818544eee4a93d7, 2b154e96fcb3f01fd42765c64e0a56820fbc16eb, cfa186a0857a0f831dfca67b16bbc40ecfdf3280, c73fb911e02b9a766c950bc9707f3e3a96ffd702, f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9f

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 2b154e96fcb3f01fd42765c64e0a56820fbc16eb; Linux/Linux to d1f0d353358987ca87f21d8956e2d2854951130d if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 11, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation decap_and_validate() pulls the outer SRv6 headers and makes the inner packet the skb network header. The IPv6 control block still contains values collected while parsing the outer packet, including nhoff and extension-header flags. End.DX6 and End.DT6 route the inner IPv6 packet directly to the IPv6 input path. An unprivileged user can reach End.DT6 from a user and net namespace by installing a local SID and injecting an outer packet with Hop-by-Hop and Destination Options headers followed by an SRH and a minimal inner IPv6 packet. The outer extension headers leave a large nhoff in IP6CB. After decapsulation, ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu() uses that stale offset on the inner packet and reads beyond the skb head. KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1118/0x1450 ip6_input_finish+0x11b/0x240 seg6_local_input_core+0xed/0x2e0 lwtunnel_input+0x1e9/0x4e0 ipv6_rthdr_rcv+0x525f/0x6c50 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xcb7/0x1450 Before clearing IP6CB for an inner IPv6 packet, save its incoming interface index and L3 slave state. Restore both after the clear and set nhoff to the inner IPv6 base-header nexthdr field. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif because VRF processing can replace skb_iif with the L3 master while IP6CB keeps the receiving interface. Preserve IP6SKB_L3SLAVE for the same reason.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 27, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record